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Derivative Action or Securities Arbitration in China: 
 Seeking A Better Alternative to Retail Shareholder Protection 
 
Gu Weixia1 
 
 
There is a large body of law and finance literature suggesting that strong legal 
protection for investors is the key to a nation’s healthy stock market development and 
economic growth. Despite remarkable progress in setting up its securities market, 
China has often been criticized for its underdeveloped regulatory regime. The wide 
securities fraud scandals in contrast with the paucity of conviction rates are 
indicative of the fact that public enforcement is inadequate in China. Private 
enforcement efforts such as securities litigation help address the disconnect between 
securities regulatory regime and investor compensation. Nevertheless, given the 
immaturity of China’s current legal and institutional framework, various factors 
preclude private securities litigation from playing an effective role in China’s market 
regulation and development. Against the background, this article seeks to explore 
alternative mechanisms for improvement of private enforcement in China. Having 
concluded that modeling the US class action system is quite unlikely to work well in 
the Chinese socio-political and socioeconomic situations, the article explores how the 
present system of securities fraud litigation should be reformed in order to balance 
the competing interests of state control, social stability, and minority shareholder 
protection in the listed companies. In view of the dominance of retail shareholders in 
the Chinese securities market and drawing on international experience, a 
cost-effective and accessible securities arbitration scheme is proposed to be 
established in China for resolving civil compensation claims. It is argued that the 
professionalism, procedural flexibility, speed, confidentiality, and cost saving features 
of arbitration could offer much potential as a deterrent and remedial device in 
addressing the deficiencies of private enforcement of securities regulation during 
economic transition in China. 
 
 
I. Introduction  
 
Developing a fair, efficient and orderly securities market is one of China’s biggest 
institutional challenges today. Since the initial economic reforms from a planned to a 
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market economy, a high private savings rate and the public’s appetite to hold risky 
securities have contributed to the impressive growth of the market. The Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges were established in 1990, and since then, the number of 
listed companies has grown exponentially. At the end of 2011, a total of 2,342 
companies were listed on the two stock exchanges,2 compared to 53 listed companies 
in 1992.3 China’s securities market, while only 20 years old, boasted a market 
capitalization of RMB 21.5 trillion at the end of 2011.4 
 
Despite remarkable progress in setting up its securities market, China has often been 
criticized for its underdeveloped regulatory regime. Unlike its overseas counterparts 
where securities markets were established to provide finance to enterprises, the 
Chinese securities market was established to assist in the reform of its financially 
distressed state-owned enterprises (SOEs).5 Given the political logic of its securities 
market, China’s securities watchdog, the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC), is handicapped in carrying out its regulatory and supervisory mandate. The 
paucity of securities fraud scandals and the modest conviction rates are indicative of 
the fact that the CSRC has inadequately enforced the law6. Meanwhile, private 
enforcement of the Securities Law, such as securities litigation played only a limited 
role in assisting the prevention of market abuse and the regulation of the securities 
market.  
 
Against this background, this article seeks to explore various mechanisms to promote 
the enforcement of the Securities Law in China. Due to the conflicting roles of the 
CSRC both as market promoter and primary market regulator for listed companies, 
the CRSC’s ability to discipline powerful wrongdoers of fraud is most likely to be 
handicapped. It would therefore appear that a further strengthening of public 
enforcement efforts per se is unlikely to be a panacea to the weak enforcement of the 
Securities Law in China. On the other hand, there is a large body of law and finance 
literature suggests that strong legal protection for investors is the key to a nation’s 
                                                      
2 The latest annual report by CSRC, the CSRC Annual Report 2012 (released on May 15, 2012), p. 4. 
Available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/about/annual/201205/P020120515677609374835.pdf 
(last visited 23 October 2012) 
3 CSRC, China’s Securities & Futures Markets 2004, p. 9. Available at 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/about/annual/200812/P020090225529630009496.doc (visited 15 
April 2012) 
4 Supranote 2, p. 16. 
5 Guanghua Yu, Comparative Corporate Governance in China: Political Economy and Legal 
Infrastructure (New York: Routledge, 2007), 23-41. 
6 Gongmeng Chen et al., “Is China’s Securities Regulatory Agency a Toothless Tiger? Evidence from 
Enforcement Actions”, 24 J. Acct. & Pub. Pol’y 451, 457 (2005) (stating that the stock markets’ “legal 
and institutional framework is still relatively primitive by Western standards”). 
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healthy stock market development and economic growth7. Private enforcement efforts 
compensate victims of securities fraud and help address the disconnect between 
securities regulatory regime and investor compensation. Nevertheless, given the 
immaturity of China’s current legal and institutional framework, various factors 
preclude private securities litigation from playing a significant role in China’s market 
regulation and development.8 Therefore, this article seeks to explore alternative 
mechanisms for improvement. 
 
To discuss these issues, this paper is structured as follows. Following this introduction, 
Section II evaluates the current level of legal protection afforded to minority public 
shareholders in listed companies in China. This section will also lay down the 
background information on the two alternatives, namely, the introduction of a class 
action system or the securities arbitration scheme in facilitating private enforcement 
of the Securities Law. To ameliorate the collective action problem faced by minority 
shareholders in lodging a securities suit, Section III discusses whether a direct 
transplantation of the class action system of the United States (US) can supply the 
optimal amount of private enforcement in China. The US is chosen because class 
actions originated in the US, and some other countries have either adopted or actively 
considered embracing the American class action procedures in their recent legal 
reforms. Answering this in the negative, Section IV next explores the feasibility of 
utilizing alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedures to resolve civil 
compensation claims. It is concluded that the procedural flexibility, speed and cost 
savings of the ADR procedures offer much potential as a deterrent and remedial 
device in policing corporate misconduct in listed companies in China. 
 
 
II. The Paradigm of Retail Shareholders Protection in China 
 
Although China is committed to establishing a modern enterprise system to cater to 
the needs of a market economy, the political logic of China’s securities market has 
contributed not only to the fragmentation of shares,9 but also to the poor corporate 
                                                      
7  Rafael La Porta, Florecio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, Legal 
Determinants of External Finance, (1997) 52 J. Fin. 1131; Rafael La Porta, Florecio Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, “Investor Protection and Corporate Governance” (1999) 58 
Journal of Financial Economics, 3; and Bernard Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for 
Strong Securities Market (2001) 48 UCLA L. Rev. 781. 
8 Marlon A. Layton, “Is Private Securities Litigation Essential for the Development of China’s Stock 
Markets”, 83 New York University Law Review (2008), 1948. 
9 To prevent investors from gaining control of SOEs through share ownership, the government created 
various classes of shares – state, legal-person, individual, and foreign – and predicated ownership on 
the shareholder’s identity. See Sandra P. Kister, “China’s Share-Structure Reform: An Opportunity to 
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governance in listed companies. One of the core governance issues of the listed SOEs 
is their highly concentrated ownership structure. In order to bring its SOEs within the 
market’s orbit without privatizing their ownership structure, the government owned 
two-thirds of the equity in listed companies as non-tradable shares,10 either directly as 
state-owned shares (guoyou gu) or indirectly as legal person shares (faren gu), until 
the launch of a share structure reform program in 2005.11 As dispersed individual 
shareholders have no meaningful influence over the decision making process in the 
SOEs, potential conflicts of interest between majority and minority shareholders 
remain a core corporate governance problem.12  
 
Moreover, the dominance of retail shareholders in the Chinese securities market 
suggests that the risk of actual fraud is heightened. Individual shareholders are given 
limited access to corporate information and lack professional knowledge on how to 
evaluate corporate performance, which has given rise to ample opportunities for 
connected transactions13 and misappropriations of corporate assets, particularly with 
respect to SOEs. Not only is the domestic securities market tainted with widespread 
insider trading, price manipulation and other fraudulent activities, the impact of poor 
governance of Chinese companies has been felt abroad when Chinese companies have 
increasingly sought overseas listings in recent years. For instance, a recent report by 
NERA Economic Consulting reported that 18% of all securities class actions in the 
US were filed against Chinese-domiciled companies or against companies with the 
principal executive officers in China, and the subject matter of such suits being 
accounting allegations14.  
 
A. Flawed Securities Framework  
 
Poor corporate governance is also attributable to the poorly drafted corporate and 
securities laws in China. Given that the development of China’s securities markets is 
                                                                                                                                                           
Move beyond Practical Solutions to Practical Problems”, 45 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
(2007), at 317-8; see also discussions below.   
10 CSRC, “China’s Securities and Futures Markets 2004”, April 2004, p. 27-28. Available at 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/about/annual/200812/P020090225529630009496.doc (visited 16 
April 2012).  
11 CSRC, “Measures on Administration of Split Share Structure Reform of Listed Companies”, 
September 2005.   
12 Donald C. Clarke, Corporate Governance in China: An Overview (2003) 14 China Economic 
Review 494. 
13 The “connected transactions” (guanlian jiaoyi) are paraphrased with “related-party transaction”. See 
Leng Jing, Corporate Governance and Financial Reform in China’s Transitional Economy (Hong 
Kong University Press, 2009), pp.152-153 (stating the high risk of related-party transactions at SOEs).  
14 Jordan Milev, Robert Patton, Svetlana Starykh and John Montgomery, “Recent Trends in Securities 
Class Action Litigation: 2011 Mid-Year Review”, p.8-12. Available at 
http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB_Trends_Year-End_1211_final.pdf (last visited 10 October 2012). 
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driven by the goal of assisting the SOE reform, securities laws and regulations have 
failed to provide adequate protection for the rights and interests of the public investors 
in China. While protecting minority shareholders from opportunistic expropriation of 
the management or the controlling shareholders has always been a critical principle of 
corporate governance, it was not the chief concern of the lawmakers in the early 
1990s. The first corporate code in China, the Company Law of 1993, aimed at 
providing legal support for the establishment of a modern enterprise system and 
setting down the political agenda of transforming SOEs into joint-stock companies. 
Although the Company Law spells out basic governance structures for all 
shareholding companies, the Chinese style shareholding system has difficulty 
reconciling the dual goals of maximizing shareholder value and maintaining state 
ownership.  
 
In an effort to maintain a fair and orderly securities market and to protect the interests 
of investors, China enacted the Securities Law in 1998, which amongst other things 
expressly prohibits various forms of market misconduct such as insider trading, 
market manipulation and inaccurate disclosure. The Securities Law was substantially 
revised in 2005, which improved the system governing the issuance, trading, 
registration and settlement of securities. It also set down more stringent requirements 
regarding information disclosure and increased the legal responsibilities on integrity 
obligations of the shareholders and other officers who are in control of the listed 
companies. Following the revision, related agencies made corresponding adjustments 
to other relevant laws and regulation documents to ensure that they better reflect 
market rules. 
 
Although legal provisions have been improved to address chronic illness of corporate 
governance, the law overemphasizes the role of the government in the securities arena. 
Public enforcement through administrative and criminal sanctions holds a more 
prominent position than private enforcement in China, despite the inadequacies of its 
enforcement. For instance, Chapter XI or the Legal Liability Chapter of the Securities 
Law of 1998 comprises of 36 articles, of which 32 carry substantive penalties in the 
form of criminal and administrative liability. The role of civil remedies has been 
overlooked, which is evidenced by the fact that there are only two articles on civil 
liability. In the absence of detailed operational provisions on how private securities 
suits can be brought, the local courts refused to hear most of the cases filed by 
investors in search of compensation for their losses suffered as a result of securities 
fraud.15 This is so despite the fact that the courts could have adopted an expansive 
                                                      
15 For instance, the action against Chengdu Hongguang Co. Ltd in 1998 for non-compliance with 
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interpretation of older pieces of legislation such as the General Principles of Civil 
Law to grant relief.16 
 
B. Inadequate Public Enforcement by the CSRC 
 
Rampant securities fraud in China does not lie in the imperfectness of the laws per se. 
Overlapping functions of the securities regulatory bodies and resource constraints 
have both contributed to the weak enforcement of the Securities Law. Until the early 
1990s, China did not have a specialized central agency to regulate the securities 
market. The two stock exchanges were supervised by their local governments with 
little oversight by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC). In the aftermath of 
stock-related protests in Shenzhen in 1991, the government decided to strengthen 
securities regulatory oversight by the establishment of the State Council Securities 
Committee (SCSC) and the CSRC in 1992. The SCSC was a ministerial-level 
government agency in charge of macro-management of the securities market and the 
primary authority for market regulation,17 while the CSRC was then designed as the 
SCSC’s executive branch to conduct supervision of the market and the securities 
firms.18 Yet, the CSRC was only a non-profit institution (shiye danwei) and lacked 
any substantial supervisory powers and tools to make rules or to punish misconduct19. 
As such, the securities market remained inadequately supervised. It was not until 1998 
that the multi-tier regulatory structure was removed and the CSRC became the 
principal regulator of the securities and futures market. Its mandate is to ensure the 
orderly and lawful operation of the securities market.20 
 
While a nationwide capital market has gradually developed and the number of listed 
companies has grown exponentially since the early 1990s, the CSRC was not well 
equipped to carry out its mandate in its early years of operation. There was no 
                                                                                                                                                           
accounting and disclosure requirements was dismissed by the court on the ground that there was no 
specific procedure for such action in China at that time. In a similar vein, the action against Shandong 
Bohai Corporation for false accounting in 1998 was rejected the initial cases brought by aggrieved 
investors.   
16 For example, the General Principles of Civil Law provides that tort victims are entitled to civil 
compensation. Additionally, the Governance Standards for Listed Companies, promulgated by the 
CSRC and the State Economic and Trade Commission in January 2002 provides that investors can seek 
compensation through civil litigation when their rights are harmed. More specifically, the revised 
Securities Law provides that issuers, underwriters and their responsible directors and other corporate 
officers can be liable for losses suffered by investors because of misrepresentation or material 
omissions in disclosure documents. 
17 Notice of the State Council Concerning Further Strengthening Macro-Administration of the 
Securities Market of 17 December 1992, Item 1(1). 
18 Id, Item 1(2). 
19 Wang Lianzhou and Li Cheng, eds., The vicissitudes of the Securities Law (Fengfeng yuyu 
zhengquanfa), Shanghai: Shanghai Sanlian shudian, 2000, p. 49.   
20 Article 166 of the Securities Law of 1998 
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enforcement bureau or other enforcement offices when it was established in 1993. 
Three years later, the predecessor of the CSRC Enforcement Bureau, the Complaints 
Division of the CSRC Legal Affairs Department, was staffed with only four members. 
During that period, Anthony Neoh, the former Chair of the Securities and Futures 
Commission in Hong Kong, remarked that both the Chinese market and its regulators 
are very unsophisticated.21 Neoh’s remark is echoed by Chinese top economist Wu 
Jinglian, who unfavorably compared the corruption-ridden market to a “casino”.22   
 
After a decade of operation, the CSRC is much better equipped to carry out its 
mandate. Unfortunately, its enforcement efforts remain inadequate. To date, it has 
established 36 securities regulatory bureaus in the provinces, autonomous regions and 
municipalities. Yet, as with other securities regulators worldwide, the CSRC is 
confronted with considerable resource constraints in fulfilling its duties. After a 
decade of operation, there were still only 289 staff members in the Enforcement 
Bureau in 2006,23 compared to a total of 1,434 companies listed on the two national 
exchanges. 24  It was said that most enforcement staff lacked experience and 
knowledge in the securities field, which presented a major disadvantage for them to 
deal with the complexities of securities crimes.25 Even after the establishment of an 
enforcement bureau in the CSRC in 2007 to facilitate the investigation of significant 
securities fraud cases and a significant increase of staff to about 600 to man the 
bureau, it appeared that public enforcement efforts remained inadequate.26 Contrary 
to the severity of insider trading and inaccurate disclosure in China’s stock market in 
2007,27 the table below28 shows that the number of sanctions imposed by the CSRC 
over the past few years seems rather modest.  
 
Year 2007 2008 2009 
Total Number of Listed Companies 1,530 1,604 1,716 
Total Number of Cases Closed  405 130 106 
                                                      
21 “A Good Beginning”, China Economic Review, March 1999, No. 3, p.19. 
22 Wu Jinglian, “China’s Stock Market Worse than Casinos (zhongguo gushi buru duchang),” 
interview with China Central Television (CCTV) in the “Conversation” (“Duihua”) program, 13 
January 2001. 
23 Hongming Cheng, Insider Trading in China: The Case for the Chinese Securities Regulatory 
Commission (2008) 15:2 Journal of Financial Crime 165, 168. 
24 CSRC, China’s Securities and Futures Markets 2007, p.3. Available at 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/about/annual/200812/P020090225529643752895.pdf (last visited 
16 April 2012). 
25 Supranote 20.  
26 Ibid. (discussing the CSRC's enforcement policies and inadequacy of enforcement).  
27 Ibid. (finding the paucity of insider trading cases and the lack of convictions for insider trading 
offences in China). 
28 The figures are extracted from the CSRC Annual Reports, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange. 
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Cases placed under informal investigation N/A 157 121 
Total Number of Sanction Decisions 54 77 N/A 
Total Number of Companies Sanctioned 26 N/A 23 
Total Number of Individuals Sanctioned  155 N/A 218 
 
Aside from a shortage of trained personnel and resources, the CSRC faces a serious 
conflict of interest in its dual role as primary market regulator and market promoter of 
the listed corporations. As most listed companies in China are SOEs,29 regulatory 
efforts of the CSRC are muddied by political considerations. Fearful of a market 
collapse and the subsequent economic and political repercussions, the CSRC is prone 
to enormous pressure not to pursue vigorously SOEs for securities fraud.  
 
C. Inadequate Private Enforcement 
 
Ideally, an institutionalized private securities litigation system can complement public 
enforcement activities of the securities regulators. As the primary role of the securities 
regulator is to ensure a fair, orderly and robust securities market, they are not in a 
position to adjudicate on any financial remedy for defrauded shareholders who 
suffered economic losses arising from securities fraud. A well-functioning private 
securities litigation system can provide additional deterrence against securities fraud, 
and at the same time, serves as a remedial device for aggrieved investors through the 
imposition of damages against the perpetrators of fraud. Nevertheless, various 
systemic and institutional obstacles, such as procedural difficulties, an absence of 
financial incentives in bringing securities suits, substantial filing fees, underdeveloped 
group litigation rules and a lack of judicial infrastructure preclude private 
enforcement from playing a significant role in securities market regulation in China. 
These obstacles lead to disincentives for public investors to detect and prosecute 
frauds and assist in the anti-securities fraud campaigns of the government, as well as 
contribute to widespread market misconduct.  
 
1. The SPC Circulars between 2001 and 2003 
 
Following the outbreak of market scandals in the 2000s, the inadequacy of the private 
securities litigation system has become an increasingly serious problem in China. As 
aggrieved investors continued to file suits at first instance courts, the Supreme 
                                                      
29 Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China (2nd ed) (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), at 266 (stating that 
“Normally, only SOEs are approved for listing on the … stock exchanges,” resulting very few listed 
private companies); see also Marlon A. Layton, “Is Private Securities Litigation Essential for the 
Development of China’s Stock Markets?”, 83 New York University Law Review (2008), at 1949.  
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People’s Court (SPC) issued three circulars between September 2001 and January 
2003 (the “SPC Circulars” hereafter) to clarify the situation.  
 
In the first circular, which was issued on 21 September 2001 (the “2001 Circular”), 
the SPC imposed a temporary ban on the acceptance by lower courts of civil 
compensation suits30. Justice Li Guoguang, the then Vice President of the SPC and 
drafter of the 2001 Circular, justified the SPC’s refusal to allow securities litigation on 
the ground that the local courts lacked resources and experience to hear these cases.31 
However, the 2001 Circular attracted severe criticism from academics, practitioners, 
and investors.32 Subsequently, this ban was partially lifted after four months33.  
 
In the second circular issued on 15 January 2002 (the “2002 Circular”), the SPC 
instructed lower courts to accept investor suits for misrepresentation on the condition 
that the company and the relevant persons had been administratively sanctioned or 
criminally convicted for the same.34 Additionally, the 2002 Circular requires a 
lawsuit to be filed within two years from the date of the decision.35 On 9 January 
2003, the SPC issued the Several Provisions on Trial of Civil Damages Cases Arising 
from Misrepresentation in the Securities Market (the “2003 Circular”), which became 
effective on 1 February 2003.36 The 2003 Circular expanded on the 2002 Circular 
and provided that both firms and individuals can be named as defendants in a 
securities suit. Individual defendants can include executives, directors, supervisory 
board members, and controlling shareholders at a listed company, as well as other 
responsible individuals at professional service firms.37 The 2003 Circular also laid 
down procedural and evidentiary requirements for bringing securities-related 
misrepresentation suits.  
 
2. Technical Constraints of Group Litigation Rules in China  
                                                      
30 Circular Regarding Non-acceptance of Securities-related Civil Compensation Cases [Zuigao Remin 
Fayuan Guanyu She Zhengquan Minshi Peichang Anjian Zan Buyu Shouli de Tongzhi], issued by the 
SPC, 21 September 2001. 
31 Li, Guoguang and JiaWei, The Civil Compensation System of Securities Market Misrepresentation 
(Zhengquan Shichang Xujia Chengshu Minshi Peichang Zhidu) (Beijing: Law Press, 2003), pp.2-3. 
32 Ibid. pp.113-114. 
33 Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Relevant Issues of Filing of Civil Tort Disputes Arising 
From Misrepresentation on the Securities Market [Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shouli Zhengquan 
Shichang yin Xujia Chenshu Yinfa de Minshi Qinquan Jiufen Anjian Youguan Wenti de Tongzhi], 
issued by the SPC, 15January 2002. 
34 Ibid.. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Several Provisions on Trial of Civil Compensation Cases Arising from Misrepresentation on the 
Securities Market [Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Zhengquan Shichang yin Xujia Chenshu 
Yinfa de Minshi Peichang Anjian de Ruogan Guiding], issued by the SPC, 9 January 2003.  
37 Articles 6 & 7 of the SPC 2003 Circular. 
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By providing a functional basis for investors to bring a private securities suit, the SPC 
Circulars raise high expectations in upgrading China’s securities regulatory 
framework, and mark a significant step forward in investor protection. Despite these 
expectations, however, the SPC Circulars have failed to promote private enforcement 
of the securities law in China.  
 
One major criticism is that the SPC Circulars unduly restrict the scope of cases for 
which civil compensation may be sought.38 Relief can only be sought for cases 
arising from misrepresentation (xujia chenshu), which is defined to include false 
statements (xujia jizai), misleading statements (wudaoxing chenshu), material 
omissions (zhongda yilou) or improper disclosures (buzhengdang pilu). 39  The 
Circulars provide no basis for private litigation based on other forms of securities 
fraud regulated by the CSRC that have been prevalent on the market, such as insider 
dealing (neimu jiaoyi) and market manipulation (caozong shichang). This effectively 
deprives defrauded investors from compensation even if the CSRC determines 
liability and imposes administrative penalties against the wrongdoers.  
 
The second line of criticism is that victims of securities fraud may be denied recovery 
due to restrictive rules on proving causation between the misrepresentation and the 
resulting financial loss. For shareholders to establish legal entitlement to 
compensation, Article 6 of the 2003 Circular provides that the plaintiffs shall bear the 
onus to prove the existence of a causal link (yinguo guanxi) between the defendant’s 
wrongdoing and the plaintiff’s loss. However, causation would not be established if 
the affected security was purchased before the misrepresentation was made, or the 
security was sold before the relevant misrepresentation was made public. 40 
Regardless of any loss that might actually have been incurred, defrauded shareholders 
are effectively excluded from compensation in not uncommon situations, such as 
when a listed company failed to disclose material price-sensitive information in a 
timely manner.41 In such an example, these shareholders may have sold their shares, 
thinking that the company’s current performance indicated a dim prospect. In fact, the 
company withheld material information, and the share price went up when the 
                                                      
38 See, for example, Hutchens Walter, “Private Securities Litigation In China: Material Disclosure 
About China’s Legal System?”, U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. (2003) 599, 630-632. See also Yin Jie, 
Zhengquan Xujia Chenshu Minshi Zheren Zhidu Lun [On The System of Civil Liability of 
Misrepresentation in Securities Fraud], 6 Faxue [Legal Science] 2003107, 110-111. 
39 Article 17 of the SPC 2003 Circular. 
40 Article 18, SPC 2003 Circular.  
41 Sanzhu Zhu, Securities Dispute Resolution in China (London: Ashgate, 2007), at 186 (summarizing 
the criticism from academics, practitioners, and judges on the cumbersome causation rule). 
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disclosure was made at a later time. Although these shareholders sold the shares at a 
price lower than what they could have obtained had they waited to sell until the 
disclosure of the price-sensitive information, they are left with no course of action 
against the wrongdoers under the SPC Circulars, not even after the wrongdoers have 
been sanctioned by the courts or the relevant administrative authorities.  The 
imposition of fines or confiscation of proceeds by the administrative authorities could 
not have assisted the shareholders either, because the fines imposed or the proceeds 
confiscated go to the State Treasury.42 
 
Another line of attack relates to the absence of financial incentives in bringing private 
securities suits in China. The matter of costs does not merely affect the efficacy of the 
private securities fraud suits, but determines whether this procedure will be utilized at 
all. From an economic point of view, plaintiffs will sue only when the expected award 
exceeds the litigation costs. However, litigation cost is a major obstacle for aggrieved 
investors to lodge a private suit to recover losses resulting from securities fraud. 
While contingency fee arrangements are generally prohibited in China,43 the SPC 
Circulars and the Securities Law remain silent on how these lawsuits should be 
funded. In this light, the general rule is that each side bears his costs of retaining 
lawyers, regardless of the outcome of the litigation.44 Should the action fail, plaintiff 
investors face the prospect of being liable for not only their own costs, but also a 
significant portion of the litigation expenses of the prevailing defendant, including 
filing fees and other costs.45 Even if the action is successful, investors may not be 
able to recover their lawyers’ fees from the losing party. This potential exposure for a 
substantial amount of costs, coupled with the absence of litigation funding in China, 
dissuades many from suing even when they have a meritorious claim. 
 
Substantial filing fees (anjian shoulifei) further erode plaintiff investors’ incentives to 
commence litigation. In China, filing fees are calculated on a sliding scale based on 
the contested amount, with a maximum percentage of 2.5 percent for amounts below 
                                                      
42 Article 234, Securities Law. 
43 In the Management Measures of Fee Charging for Lawyers’ Services (promulgated by the Ministry 
of Justice on 13 April 2006 and came into force on 1 December 2006), Article 12 expressly provides 
that outcome-related fees are prohibited in criminal cases, administrative cases, state compensation 
cases and class action cases. Article 4 further provides that lawyers should charge service fees using the 
government-directed prices (zhengfu zhidao jia) and the market-regulated prices (shichang tiaojie jia).  
44 In Daqing Lianyi case, claimants sought to recover all their attorneys’ fees from the losing defendant 
company. The court rejected the claim, suggesting that it was “groundless in law”. “Chen Lihua Deng 
23 Ming Touziren Su Daqing Lianyi Gongsi, Shenyin Zhengquan Gongsi Xujia Chenshu Qinquan 
Peichang Jiufen An” [Chen Lihua and Others v Daqing Lianyi Co and Shenqing Securities Company 
for Damages Arising from False Statements], in Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gonggao [Gazette of the 
Supreme People’s Court] (2005: No. 11) 30. 
45 While Chinese courts generally awards trial costs to the winner, such costs are usually defined only 
as funds paid to the court as filing and other fees and do not include attorney’s fees.  
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RMB 10,000 and a minimum of 0.5 percent for amounts above RMB 20 million.46 
Although filing fees are borne by the losing party, they usually are advanced by 
plaintiffs when the action is brought. 47 Thus, plaintiffs are presented with an 
immediate high expense if they seek recovery of any significant funds. The problem is 
aggravated when the court decides to hold multiple trials for various similar 
individual claims. This point is borne out by the landmark ST Dongfang case. In this 
case, it was reported that the court required the sixty-one plaintiffs to be split into 
groups of no more than ten plaintiffs each as a requirement for accepting the case, 
without offering any justification.48 As a result, it would appear uneconomical to 
pursue modest claims, and would therefore deter most resource-poor investors from 
seeking redress through litigation and from gaining access to justice.  
 
A related criticism is that the representative group litigation (daibiaoren susong) rules 
in China are underdeveloped49, and restrictive group litigation rules apply in the 
context of securities litigation. Article 14 of the 2003 Circular provides that in cases 
joint action (gongtong susong),50 the number of plaintiffs must be determined prior to 
trial. Furthermore, substantial filing fees must be advanced by plaintiffs in full upfront 
when the case is brought, and judgments bind only those who have registered their 
rights to the court. As shareholders are geographically dispersed across China, this 
arrangement is likely to require significant upfront costs, say, to aggregate a massive 
number of claims and to seek assent from all the plaintiffs to opt into litigation.  
 
This is to be contrasted with the more plaintiff-friendly representative litigation rules 
under Article 55 of the Civil Procedure Law, which allows for cases to be brought by 
an undefined number of litigations51. The courts are empowered to organize affected 
individuals into a class by issuing a public notice instructing persons who are entitled 
to participate in the action to register with the people’s court and opt into litigation 
within a specific period of time52. Additionally, plaintiffs in Article 55 actions are 
                                                      
46 State Council, Measures of Charging Litigation Fees (Susong Feiyon Jiaona Banfa) (2006), Art 13.  
47 Art 107, Civil Procedure Law. 
48 “Zhengquan Minshi Susong Xin Wenti, Gongtong Susong Yuangao Renshu Shouxian” [A New 
Problem in Private Securities Litigation: The Number of Plaintiffs in Joint Actions are Limited], 
Zhengquan Shibao [Securities Times], 9 April 2003, available at 
http://rmrb.com.cn/GB/jinji/35/159/20030409/966783.htmlhttp://rmrb.com.cn/GB/jinji/35/159/200304
09/966783.html (last visited 16 April 2012).  
49 Matters concerning the institution of class actions provided for under the Civil Procedure Law and 
the Opinion on Several Issues Regarding the Implementation of Civil Procedure Law of the PRC 
[Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong fa Ruogan 
Wenti De Yijian] (the “SPC Civil Procedure Law Opinion”), promulgated by the SPC, 14 July 1992 
have not been amended since their promulgation in 1991 and 1992, respectively.  
50 Article 12, SPC 2003 Circular. 
51 Article 55, Civil Procedure Law. 
52 Ibid. 
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relieved from paying filing fees upfront53. Similar to the class actions suits in the US, 
the results of the Article 55 litigation will be binding on those who have registered 
their rights with the court and also those unregistered members who are not time 
barred from lawsuit.  
 
Unfortunately, fearful that listed companies could become a target of rising public 
anger over endemic market frauds and due to the apprehension to open floodgates to 
many complex securities cases54, the SPC has effectively denies potential plaintiffs 
from utilizing the more robust representative litigation rules under Article 55 for 
bringing civil compensation claims. This deprives investors from the benefits of the 
economies of scale in litigation that are otherwise available under the existing legal 
framework, and reduces the effectiveness of private securities litigation in China.  
 
3. Lack of Judicial Infrastructure  
 
Despite recent reforms to strengthen their competence,55 concerns have frequently 
been voiced about the institutional deficiencies of the judiciary. The courts’ 
difficulties stem from the tradition that judges have been selected from non-legal 
careers and have received little or no formal education, let alone legal training, prior 
to assignment to the bench. Coupled with the short history of securities regulation, it 
is hardly surprising that judges lack competence to correctly adjudicate securities 
fraud cases, which are technical and fall within a specialized area of the law. The 
technicality and complexity of matters is particularly true in securities cases, where 
the retail investors may be both the victims of securities fraud, as well as contributors 
to the commission of market misconduct by engaging in speculative short-term 
transactions in the marketplace. Not only will judges find it difficult to distinguish 
violations of the Securities Law from non-violations, they may also encounter 
difficulties in applying legal principles and assigning culpability across defendants 
consistently.56  
 
4. Summary: The need for reform  
                                                      
53 The filing fees will be borne by the losing party after the case is concluded. See Article 129 of the 
SPC Civil Procedure Law Opinion. 
54 Bei Hu, “China urged to adopt class action suits”, 21 November 2002, South China Morning Post.  
55 For instance, since 2002, all new judges in China are required to possess bachelor’s degrees. The 
Supreme People’s Court further stated that sitting judges who are under the age of 40 are required to 
obtain a degree within five years or will lose their jobs. Judges who are above the age of 40 and lack 
university education is permitted to stay on if they completed a training course. See Benjamin Liebman, 
China’s Courts: Restricted Reform (2007) China Quarterly, 620.  
56 Marlon A. Layton, “Is Private Securities Litigation Essential for the Development of China’s Stock 
Markets?”, 83 New York University Law Review (2008), at 1967 (stating the current legal and political 
environment does not support a greater role for private securities litigation).  
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It is true that China has dedicated great efforts to upgrade its securities regulatory 
regime and to further investor protection in the past years, but the overall situation is 
still far from satisfactory. The SPC Circulars failed to provide defrauded shareholders 
with a cost-effective procedure through which they can gain access to the courts. The 
absence of economic incentives and the high upfront costs in bringing securities fraud 
suits deterred most retail investors from achieving recourse through civil litigation. 
Indeed, few would dare invest in the high filing fee and other expenses upfront in 
exchange for negligible compensation that might possibly result.  
 
According to a recent study by Liebman and Milhaupt, only about 15 percent of the 
suit-eligible companies have in fact been sued in the years following the promulgation 
of the SPC Circulars.57 While 15 percent may seem high at first glance, it must be 
noted that these companies have already been sanctioned by the CSRC or other 
administrative authorities for misrepresentation in their disclosure documents. 
Because the factual finding of wrongdoing has already been made, these suit-eligible 
companies would appear to be easy targets for securities suits. Yet, over 80 percent of 
these eligible companies have not been sued in practice. Furthermore, only a handful 
of cases have resulted in the imposition of liability on the defendant, while a small 
number of cases have been settled after court mediation.58 According to Yixin Song, 
a prominent securities lawyer in China, about 10,000 investors or 10 percent of the 
shareholders who are eligible to sue have initiated securities-related lawsuits by the 
end of July 2006, but only some 1,000 of them have obtained some form of redress.59 
The amount of damages claimed represents less than 5 percent of the total losses 
incurred by the public investors as a result of securities fraud.60 Even if regulators 
have punished some of the most outrageous manipulators in the securities market, lax 
enforcement of the law has led to the extensive misappropriation and securities fraud 
on the market,61 because the risk of being caught and penalized is so slim as to be 
                                                      
57 Benjamin L. Liebman & Curtis J. Milhaupt, “Reputational Sanctions in China’s Securities Market”, 
108 (2008) Columbia Law Review 929, 943. 
58 Katharina Pistor and Chenggang Xu, “Governing Stock Markets in Transition Economies: Lessons 
from China”, (2005) 7(1) American Law and Economics Review 184, 193. 
59 Song Yixin, “Accelerate the Development of Securities Civil Compensation System in China” 
(Jiakuai Tuijin Zhengquan Minshi Peichang Fazhi Jianshe), China Securities Daily [Zhongguo 
Zhengquan Bao], July 27, 2006. 
60 Report by China Securities Daily [Zhongguo Zhengquan Bao], 24 July 2006, available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/stock/2006-07/24/content_4871138.htm (visited 16 April 2012).  
61 Zhong Zhang, “Legal Deterrence: the foundation of corporate governance – evidence from China”, 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, Volume 15, Issue 5, pages 741–767, September 2007, 
available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1017406http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab
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negligible, whereas the potential gain from fraudulent activities can be very lucrative. 
Companies and other wrongdoers are not sufficiently punished for their fraud, thus 
affecting public confidence in the market. 
 
 
III. Empowering Shareholders’ Rights: The Class Action Solution? 
 
The prevalence of securities fraud on the market and the importance of investor 
protection have led scholars to consider supplementary mechanisms for regulatory 
enforcement62. Under the US federal law, persons with similar causes of action and 
standing are allowed to pool their claims and resources to bring one single action, 
after obtaining prior certification from the court. Therefore, class actions are seen as a 
useful procedure to achieve economies of scale and to overcome the collective action 
problem in bringing actions that will affect the interests of a group.63  
 
One major feature of the American securities class action system is the opt-out 
provision. Persons who hold claims concerning questions that are raised in the class 
proceeding are bound by any resulting judgments, unless they affirmatively elect to be 
excluded64. To facilitate access to the courts, various fee-shifting mechanisms such as 
the contingency fee arrangement are in place to relieve class members from the 
financial burden of launching these suits. Contrary to the usual costs rule, whereby 
each party to litigation pays his legal bill, attorneys under the contingency fee 
arrangement will charge nothing if a case is lost. If the case is settled or is successful, 
attorneys will be paid on a percentage of damages recovered, which usually ranges 
between 25 and 30 percent in the US. Since class members are generally not liable for 
the costs of unsuccessful suits, the contingency fee arrangement provides financial 
                                                                                                                                                           
stract_id=1017406 (last visited 16 April 2012). 
62 See, for example, Wallace Wen-Yeu Wang and Jian-lin Chen, “Reforming China’s Securities Civil 
Actions: Lessons From U.S. PSLRA Reform and Taiwan’s Government-Sanctioned Non-Profit 
Organization, (2008) 21 Colum. J. Asian L. 115, p. 117. 
63 Eligible cases should meet four threshold requirements under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, namely, numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation. In addition, 
Rule 23(b) provides that a class action may be maintained if one of the three conditions contained 
therein is satisfied. The first category of action under Rule 23(b) is that the pursuance of separate 
actions by or against individual class members would either establish incompatible standards of 
conduct for the party opposing the class, or practically impair the interests of class members who are 
not parties to the adjudication: Rule 23(b)(1). The second category of action is that the party opposing 
the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that the final 
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a while: Rule 
23(b)(2). The third category of action is the common question action: Rule 23(b)(3). In practice, this 
requirement is met when the court finds that questions of law or fact common to class members 
predominate over questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to 
other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the dispute in question 
64 Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
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incentives for defrauded investors to pursue securities claim that otherwise would not 
be brought at all. 
 
The most beneficial aspect of the class action mechanism for potential plaintiffs is to 
overcome cost-related hurdles in bringing an action. While each individual’s loss is 
insufficient to make the undertaking of individual litigation financially viable, the 
aggregate claims of the plaintiff class may be substantial enough to justify the 
potential costs. To facilitate access to the courts, various fee-shifting mechanisms such 
as the contingency fee arrangement are in place to relieve class members from the 
financial burden of launching these suits. Contrary to the usual costs rule, whereby 
each party to litigation pays his legal bill, attorneys under the contingency fee 
arrangement will charge nothing if a case is lost. If the case is settled or is successful, 
attorneys will be paid on a percentage of damages recovered, which usually ranges 
between 25 and 30 percent in the US. Since class members are generally not liable for 
the costs of unsuccessful suits, the contingency fee arrangement provides financial 
incentives for defrauded investors to pursue securities claim that otherwise would not 
be brought at all. With the contingency fee arrangement, the class action system could 
enhance access to justice and provide retail investors with an economic means to 
obtain redress for corporate misconduct.  
 
Apart from economic considerations, class actions also help redress the imbalance 
between the wrongdoers of fraud and the minority public shareholders.65 In the 
Chinese context, the former are usually connected with powerful local interests, but 
there are no organized investor groups with comparable capacity for the minority 
public shareholders. The class action system can thus help these shareholders 
overcome fears of retaliation from the wrongdoers and assist them to a remedy should 
an action be brought by any member of the class on behalf of all members. Seen in 
this light, private securities litigation offers much potential as a useful deterrent and 
remedial device to police the corporate insiders. A growing number of jurisdictions66 
have actively considered adopting the American class action procedures to promote 
private enforcement.67 In the wake of a series of securities fraud scandals at the turn 
of this century, scholars in China have also called for the adoption of a US-style class 
action system to improve shareholders’ access to justice.68 
                                                      
65 Herbert B Newberg and Alba Conte, Newberg on Class Actions (4th ed) (Colorado Springs, 
McGraw-Hill Inc. 2001), p 478. 
66 For example, the European Union, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, and the UK. 
67 See, for example, Lisa Rickard, “The Class Action Debate in Europe: Lessons from the U.S. 
Experience”. Available at http://www.europeanbusinessreview.com/?p=273 (last visited 12 April, 
2012). 
68 See, for example, Weijian Tang and Wei Chen, “Woguo Jituan Susong Zhidu de Yizhi Lujing Tanxi” 
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Nonetheless, the fundamental flaw of the class action system is that unnecessary and 
frivolous lawsuits may be encouraged for the sole purpose to coerce settlements that 
are disproportionate to the merits of the plaintiff’s claims.69 With the opt-out rule, 
plaintiffs can commence proceedings on behalf of persons with no individual litigious 
interest or persons who do not even know the existence of the class action. The 
combined effect of the opt-out rule and the contingency fee arrangement hence gives 
rise to a serious risk that attorneys may simply discover a cause of action, find a 
plaintiff and then boilerplate a class action suit. Given the litigation costs and the 
disruptive impact on the company’s operations, defendant corporations in the US are 
often inclined to settle low value compensation claims early on, regardless of their 
underlying merits. 70 One possible consequence is that unmeritorious cases are 
allegedly brought and pursued solely in the hope that the management will offer a 
handsome settlement to rid itself of the nuisance. Such risk of abusive litigation has  
even deterred the legal profession in the UK from adopting a similar system.71  
 
Even for meritorious litigation, class actions are said to reduce average shareholder 
welfare.72 Class action suits divert corporate resources from focusing on their normal 
activities.73 Additionally, significant fee awards and settlement amounts result in 
higher director and officer insurance premiums. The premium, together with increased 
operating costs and the settlement sum, is ultimately passed on to shareholders.74 
Critics have therefore rightly pointed out that securities class actions are 
pocket-shifting wealth transfers by shareholders who own shares of the company at 
the time of settlement to plaintiff shareholders of the securities suit that enriches the 
                                                                                                                                                           
(Transplanting Foreign Experience to Reform the Mass Litigation System in China), Political Science 
and Law (Zhengzhi Yu Falu), Issue 1, 2008. See also, Jianfeng Pan and Fuyong Chen, “Lun 
Zhengquan Minshi Qinquan Peichang Anjian de Susong Fangshi” (On the Action Form of Civil Torts 
Compensation Cases Concerning Negotiable Securities), The Political Science and Law Tribune 
(Zhengfa Luntan), Issue 3, 2004.  
69  Robert D.Cooter & Daniel L. Rubenfield, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their 
Resolution, (1989) 27 J. Econ. Lit. 1067, 1075-82. 
70 Deborah R Hensler & Ors, Class Action Dilemmas: Pursuing Public Goods for Private Gain (Santa 
Monica: RAND Institute for Civil Justice 2000), 119-120. 
71 The introduction of a class action system was initially proposed in the Finance Bill 2010, but was 
the proposal was subsequently dropped in the rush for the May 2010 General Election. See “May 
Election kills UK Class Action Proposals”, the Insurance Insider, 13 April 2010. Available at 
http://www.insuranceinsider.com/may-election-kills-uk-class-action-proposals (last visited 16 April 
2012).  
72 John Coffee, “Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its 
Implementation”, 106 (2006) Columbia Law Review 1534, 1534. 
73 It was reported that between 1999 and 2004, one major drugmaker in the United States spent 
US$25billion on legal costs and reserves to fight class action lawsuits, while devoting only 
US$19billion to research and development. 
74 Luigi Zingales et al., “Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation”, November 
2006, 78. Available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf 
(last visited 16 April 2012). 
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entrepreneurial lawyers at the expense of average shareholders.75  
 
Opt-out class actions also present a serious conflict of interest between class members 
and their attorneys. Because attorneys acting for the class will be paid and recoup 
significant out-of-pocket expenditure if the litigation is successfully concluded, they 
will often have a strong financial incentive to settle in the shortest amount of time 
possible and may be tempted to accept suboptimal or heavily discounted settlements 
at the expense of class members whose interests he is appointed to guard.76 The risk 
of conflict is further exacerbated by the lack of protection of the interests of the class 
members in the class action procedure, since class members typically play a small role 
in the litigation. It is thus reported that securities class action suits recover only a 
small percentage of the alleged investor loss. For instance, between 2004 and 2008, 
the median ratio of settlements compared to investor losses has ranged between two 
and three percent, contrary to the dramatic increase in the amount of settlement 
payments over the years.77 Plaintiff attorneys, however, have received massive fee 
awards that are disproportionate to the time and effort expended in a case. In a 
landmark case of the Bank of Boston settlement, each of the individual class members 
was awarded US$8.76 while the class counsel received US$8.5 million in fees.78  
 
The above analysis reveals that whilst the class action system and the contingency fee 
arrangement can help police the corporate management, they are most unlikely to 
improve the prospects for a minority shareholder substantially. The problems that 
plague class actions in the US may vary in importance when applied in China. Should 
a securities class action system be introduced in China, it may open the floodgates of 
frivolous or unmeritorious litigation. It may encourage unnecessary litigation if a class 
action regime were introduced in China which, unlike some other legal cultures, is not 
a litigious society. Additionally, securities suits may be heavily driven by lawyers with 
a view to profit from lucrative fee awards, which may expose listed companies to 
massive private securities fraud litigation on a scale that China can ill afford, as a 
majority of the listed companies in China are SOEs, or otherwise controlled by the 
Government. Successful cases, on the other hand, can exert inexorable pressure on 
                                                      
75 See, for example, John Coffee, “Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement”, 156 (2007) 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 229, 302-305. See also Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith, 
“Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance 
Market”, 74 (2007) University of Chicago Law Review, 487, 495. 
76 John Coffee, “Understanding the Plaintiffs’ Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for 
Private Enforcement of Law through Class and Derivative Actions”, (1986) 86 Columbia Law Review 
669. 
77 It is reported that the average settlement amount between 2002 and 2007 rose to US$40.5 million, 
about two and a half times the average settlement amount of US$16.3 million from 1996 to 2001, 
supranote 65, pp. 8-9. 
78 Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston, 92 F. 3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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listed companies to large settlement amounts. This may threaten current share prices 
and even force the companies into dissolution in extreme cases,79 which may inhibit 
the privatization reform process of the SOEs that the securities market in China is 
designed to assist80. As the US experience illustrates, these bounty-hunter class 
actions may as well lead to over enforcement and hence over deterrence of securities 
fraud, which may dissuade foreign companies from entering into the country’s 
securities market. 
 
In addition to the perceived risk of abuse, institutional differences between the US and 
China may operate as a key impediment to the modeling of the US-style class action 
regime in China. Unlike their counterparts in the US, a major hurdle confronting 
shareholders in China is the limited access to legal representation. The Government 
has maintained tight control over the participation of lawyers in joint or mass actions 
for social stability reasons. In April 2006, the All China Lawyers’ Association, a 
government-backed regulatory body for lawyers in China, promulgated a Guiding 
Opinion on the Handling of Mass Suits by Lawyers (the “Guiding Opinion”).81 The 
Guiding Opinion stipulates that lawyers who are engaged to handle a mass suit (qunti 
anjian) are subject to supervision and guidance of the judicial administration 
departments.82 A mass suit is defined as an action where either side consists of ten or 
more individuals who are bound by common questions of law or fact83. Lawyers are 
also required to report to the responsible government agencies as soon as they are 
aware of any signs that suggest potential intensification of the conflict or any actions 
on their clients’ part that may threaten social stability.84 In the absence of unrestricted 
access to legal representation, doubts are casted as to whether the class action system 
can enhance shareholders’ recourse to justice dramatically. Moreover, the existing 
legal regime fails to offer a fixed solution to issues such as stockholders’ standing to 
sue and the allocation of burden of proof, making private securities litigation 
                                                      
79 Richard M. Philips and Gilbert C. Miller, “The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: 
Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs, Defendants and Lawyers”, 51 
(1996) Business Law 1009, 1028  
80 The goals of SOE reform are not simply to enhance corporate productivity and financial 
performance, but to create an optimal institutional arrangement compatible with the reform of a 
market-oriented economy. OECD Working Group on Privatisation and Corporate Governance of State 
Owned Assets, Occasional Paper, “State Owned Enterprises in China: Reviewing the Evidence”, 
January 2009. Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/corporateaffairs/corporategovernanceofstate-ownedenterprises/4209549
3.pdf (last visited 20 October 2012). 
81 Guiding Opinion on the Handling of Mass Suits by Lawyers [Zhonghua Quanguo Lvshi Xiehui 
Guanyu Lvshi Banli Quntixing Anjian de Zhidao Yijian], issued by All China Lawyers’ Association, 
April 2006. 
82 Article 1(3) of the Guiding Opinion. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Article 2 of the Guiding Opinion. 
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extremely difficult to handle.85 
 
A related concern is that most local people’s courts in China lack independence86. 
Although China’s Constitutional Law recognizes the independence of the courts as a 
whole,87 local governments control local courts through their control of the budget, 
and power to appoint, promote and remove judges.88 This is especially problematic in 
light of China’s current issues of widespread protectionism and corruption.89 Local 
courts may not be able to fend off local Party and governmental pressures that may 
violate due process and independent judicial decision-making. The risk of undue 
interference is particularly imminent if the interest of that government or the SOE in 
that locality is at issue in a case pending before the court. Not only are courts hesitant 
to allow claims against important local companies or persons, they are subject to 
extensive oversight by the judicial committees within the court (shenpan weiyuanhui) 
who virtually decides how important or politically sensitive cases should be decided.90 
As judges rarely resist the committee’s determination or recommendation, this 
encroaches upon the independent decision-making process. Besides, the performance 
of judges is evaluated based on the number of cases they processed91. Since it is likely 
to disadvantage the court’s caseload, judicial hostility towards class action may 
intensify should it be implemented in China.92  
 
During its transition from a planned to a market economy and in the process of 
developing the rule of law, better shareholder protection through the provision of the 
private securities class action mechanism is unlikely to be feasible in China’s current 
political-legal landscape. The reluctance to permit private securities litigation, 
particularly those based on class actions involving a large number of plaintiffs reflects 
a broader concern relating to social stability. Class actions carry significant political 
overtones because they are likely to involve politically well-connected local entities 
or persons. More fundamentally, class actions carry significant political overtones in 
                                                      
85 Daniel Fung and Wang Shengchang, Arbitration in China: A Practical Guide (Hong Kong: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2004), para 24-08. 
86 Chinese local courts are funded and subsidized by the relevant local people’s government. See 
Albert Chen, An Introduction to the Legal System of the People’s Republic of China (4th ed) (HK: 
LexisNexis, 2011), p. 200-204. 
87 Article 126 of the Constitution, and Article 4 of the Organic Law of People’s Courts.  
88 Article 127 of the Constitution (stating that while the Supreme People’s Court supervises the 
adjudicative work of all lower level people’s courts, it has no power over their budgets). 
89 Gu Weixia, “Judicial Review over Arbitration in China: Assessing the Extent of the Latest 
Pro-Arbitration Move by the Supreme People’s Court in the People’s Republic of China”, 27 (2009)  
Wisconsin International Law Journal, pp. 258-259 (stating that “local protectionism must be prevalent 
unless the court can relieve itself from the budget constraints”). 
90 Albert Chen, An Introduction to the Legal System of the People’s Republic of China (2011), 186. 
91 Benjamin Liebman, “Class Action Litigation in China”, 111 (1998) Harvard Law Review 1523. 
92 Ibid. 
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the Chinese securities context. Class actions provide the means through which a group 
of aggrieved shareholders are organized into a class, which has the potential to 
destabilize the society and understandably, trigger anxiety in the government. Some 
local judges have even expressed in interviews that mass actions are politically too 
risky,93 and that political stability is preferred to other market values.94 In this light, 
Chinese courts have historically been, and are unlikely that they will in the near future, 
be hospitable fora for defrauded investors to seek compensation for losses resulting 
from securities fraud. 
 
 
IV. Securities Arbitration: An Alternative Out  
 
Having concluded that modeling the US class action system in China is quite unlikely 
to supply the optimal level of private enforcement to police corporate misconduct and 
to deter securities fraud in China, this section explores how the present system of 
securities fraud litigation should be reformed in order to balance the competing 
interests of state control, social stability, and minority shareholder protection in the 
listed companies. In view of the dominance of retail shareholders in the Chinese 
securities market, a cost-effective and accessible alternative dispute resolution 
mechanism may be more feasible in addressing the deficiencies of the private 
enforcement of securities regulation. The following section will focus on one of the 
more promising mechanisms in this area, securities arbitration. 
 
A. The Rise of ADR in the Settlement of Financial Disputes 
 
During the last few years, alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms, such as 
mediation and arbitration, have been gaining popularity in the settlement of financial 
disputes. In essence, mediation is a voluntary dispute resolution process in which an 
independent neutral person, the mediator, helps the parties resolve their disputes and 
reach a negotiated settlement.95 Arbitration, on the other hand, is more akin to 
litigation than mediation. It is a private means of resolving disputes through the use of 
neutral third parties known as arbitrators, who are usually appointed by agreement of 
the disputing parties. As compared to litigation, arbitration is less formal, as it 
                                                      
93 Walter Hutchens, “Private Securities Litigation in Chia: Material Disclosure about China’s Legal 
System?”, 24 (2003) U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 645. 
94 Nicholas Howson, “Judicial Independence and the Company Law in Shanghai Courts”, in Randall 
Peerenboom (ed), Judicial Independence in China: Lessons for Global Rule of Law Promotion 
(Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 135, 147. 
95 Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Alternative Dispute Resolution (2nd ed, West Group: 2001), 62. 
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emphasizes equity and efficiency above strict observance of legal norms.96  
 
The speed and cost savings associated with ADR mechanisms offer much appeal in 
the settlement of financial disputes. Rather than having generalist judges who have to 
rely upon the assistance of experts and may prolong the hearing and increase the costs, 
arbitration is, by contrast, cheaper and speedier as experts who are knowledgeable 
about the customs of an industry may be appointed by parties to serve as arbitrators. 
The recent years have, therefore, seen an increasing worldwide interest in ADR 
mechanisms to resolve financial and securities disputes. For instance, in Rodriguez de 
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Inc., the highest court of the US upheld the 
enforceability of pre-arbitration agreements to settle disputes between broker-dealers 
and their customers.97 In addition to the affirmation by the court, the Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) offers investors the option to resolve disputes 
via mediation or arbitration of which arbitration is the more popular one. Throughout 
2011, a total of 4,729 arbitration cases were filed through the FINRA process and 572 
parties agreed to go to mediation.98 In Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority appointed the Hong Kong International Arbitration Center (HKIAC) to 
administer the Lehman Brothers-Related Investment Products Dispute Mediation and 
Arbitration Scheme to resolve mini-bonds claims between banks and investors arising 
from the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008.99 In a similar vein, the Financial 
Ombudsman Service (FOS) has been established in the United Kingdom to resolve 
consumer financial disputes.100 The FOS provides free and independent advice to 
consumers regarding the resolution of disputes with financial companies. According 
to the figures revealed by the CityUK, an independent body established to promote 
the financial and related professional services industry in the UK, the total number of 
disputes that have been resolved through arbitration and mediation reached a total of 
34,541 in 2009, up over three quarters from 19,384 in 2007.101  
 
Mediation and arbitration are also popular dispute settlement alternatives in China. 
                                                      
96 Ibid., at 138. 
97 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Inc. 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
98 The figures in 2010 were that 5,680 cases had been filed through the FINRA process and 497 cases 
closed through mediation. Source: Dispute Resolution Statistics by FINRA, available at 
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/AboutFINRADR/Statistics/ (last visited 16 April 2012). 
99 Gu Weixia, “ADR and Financial Disputes in Hong Kong: The Lehman Brothers Experience and The 
Way Forward” [2011] Asian Dispute Review, 20. 
100 See http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/ 
101 The CityUK, “Dispute Resolution in London and the UK 2010”, available at 
http://www.thecityuk.com/research/our-work/reports-list/dispute-resolution-in-london-and-the-uk-2010
/http://www.thecityuk.com/research/our-work/reports-list/dispute-resolution-in-london-and-the-uk-201
0/http://www.thecityuk.com/research/our‐work/reports‐list/dispute‐resolution‐in‐london‐and‐the‐uk
‐2010/ (last accessed 12 April 2012). 
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Indeed, as early as 1994, Chinese law has recognized arbitration as a legitimate choice 
for the resolution of intra-corporate conflicts in the context of Chinese corporations 
that are listed abroad.  Article 163 of the Mandatory Provisions of Articles of 
Association of Companies Seeking Overseas Listing (Dao Jingwai Shangshigongsi 
Zhangcheng Bibei Tiaokuan) provides for a compulsory arbitration clause whereby 
the disputes between a Chinese corporation that is listed in Hong Kong and its 
shareholders must be submitted to arbitration in China International Economic and 
Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) or the HKIAC.102 In addition, the SPC 
Circulars provide the legislative support for the use of ADR methods to settle civil 
compensation claims arising from misrepresentation in the disclosure documents of a 
listed corporation.103 Article 4 of the 2003 Circular instructs the people’s courts to 
stress (zhaozhong) mediation while adjudicating cases and to encourage settlement of 
private securities fraud disputes. Seen in this light, ADR could play an important role 
in handling the large number of securities-related fraud disputes in China. The 
people’s courts have limited resources, but ADR could help ensure timely and 
efficient proceedings. 
 
B. The Way Forward: Securities Arbitration Scheme  
 
At present, there is no mechanism outside of the courts that can achieve the outcome 
of dispute resolution where aggrieved shareholders can recover their financial losses 
from the wrongdoers of securities fraud. Drawing upon this global ADR trend, and 
bearing in mind the need to improve shareholders’ access to justice, it is proposed that 
defrauded shareholders who have suffered financial losses resulting from securities 
fraud shall be provided with an additional avenue to resolve civil compensation 
claims with wrongdoers of fraud in a cost-effective and expeditious manner. Unduly 
legalistic procedures should be avoided to keep it simple for average retail 
shareholders.  
 
In view of the institutional experience in the US and HK, it is advocated that a 
securities arbitration scheme should be introduced in China for the resolution of civil 
compensation claims that falls within the scope of the Securities Law. Even though 
securities arbitration has not achieved full legal efficacy, the securities industry has 
long reached a consensus regarding the necessity of a dispute resolution scheme 
                                                      
102 See the CSRC webpage on the interpretation of the law, available at 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/ssb/ssflfg/bmgzjwj/ssgszl/200911/t20091110_167714.htm (last 
accessed 16 April 2012). 
103 The Rules instruct courts to use mediation as a method of resolving cases concerning 
misrepresentation in accordance with principles and procedures of mediation set out in the Civil 
Procedure Law. 
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combining low cost and high efficiency. 
 
1. Theoretical Merits of Securities Arbitration 
 
While arbitration procedures bear many resemblances with those in court proceedings, 
arbitration is superior to litigation in resolving securities disputes in three aspects. 
First, an arbitrator is more familiar with the securities regulatory regime and the 
commercial realities involved in a case. Unlike litigation where there is a need to 
explain technical matters to generalist judges, the use of expert determination in 
arbitration allows for speedy resolution of disputes. Hence, it satisfies the need of the 
securities market for an industry-specific type of dispute resolution.104 Second, 
parties to arbitration can tailor procedures to make them appropriate to the 
circumstances of a particular case. Accordingly, there is more scope for relevant 
issues to be identified quickly and accurately to avoid unnecessary delay and expenses. 
Third, arbitral hearings are carried out in private and the awards are only published in 
an anonymous manner.105Further, arbitrators are required by the ethical rules to 
maintain all information revealed during a case in strict confidence.106 Hence, it is 
particularly appealing to the business confidence. This is especially vital for securities 
disputes, as the securities market is sensitive, volatile, and responsive to such news.  
 
More importantly, arbitration is suited to resolving civil compensation claims arising 
from securities fraud in China, and thus complements the weak enforcement of the 
Securities Law. Because legal development lagged behind economic development in 
China, the resolution of disputes based on the principles of equity and fairness of 
arbitration in the securities context offers much flexibility to deal with scenarios 
where there are gaps between the law in the text and law in reality in China. The use 
of arbitration also saves scarce Chinese judicial resources by relieving local courts 
from the need to hear a large number of civil compensation cases when a scandal 
breaks out, and thus enhances judicial efficiency in China.107 Moreover, the speed 
                                                      
104  This is particularly true in China, because judges are generally less experienced than judges in 
dealing with commercial disputes. 
105 CIETAC Rule (2005), providing that an arbitral tribunal may not hear cases in an open session  
106 Article 13 of the Ethic Rules of Arbitrators of CIETAC, available at the CIETAC website: 
http://cn.cietac.org/Arbitration/ArbitrationRule.shtmlhttp://cn.cietac.org/Arbitration/ArbitrationRule.sh
tml (last visited 16 April 2012). 
107 For instance, in the past decade, several highly sensational cases involving listed corporations have 
occurred, such as the Shenzhen Kondarl (Group) Co Ltd in 2000, New NongKai Global Investments Ltd 
and Xin Jiang Hops Co Ltd in 2003, etc. Numerous lawsuits have filed against these listed corporations 
which have been involved in corporate malpractice. Unfortunately, process of the settlement of these 
lawsuits is often blocked by procedural issues before the substantive issues are treated and damages 
paid. See Daniel Fung and Wang Shengchang, Arbitration in China: A Practical Guide (HK: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2004), para 24-04. 
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and cost savings associated with arbitration offers a practical and economic alternative 
for most resource-poor Chinese retail investors to police corporate behavior. 
Economic analysis of law has occupied an outstanding position in securities research. 
When determining the pros and cons of a particular dispute resolution related to 
securities in China, arbitration is expected to prosper because it can offer the most 
synergies in terms of efficiency and cost-saving. Securities arbitration therefore has 
the potential to improve shareholders’ access to justice in China.108  
 
Stability of the securities market is particularly important in the context of China 
because its securities market is still at its infant stage. Arbitration may also realize this 
dimension of purpose. As was mentioned before, arbitration keeps the disputes 
confidential and prevents wide spread of sensitive information. Through the 
confidential and stable progress of the dispute resolution, greater stability in the 
securities market may be achieved at minimal cost and with maximum efficiency. 
Therefore, arbitration may serve dual purposes of protecting interests of minority 
shareholders on the one hand, and of keeping normal social order in the securities 
market on the other hand.109 In this sense, securities arbitration may enhance social 
stability.110 
 
2. Institutional Set-up of the Securities Arbitration Scheme  
 
Creating a new entity at the national level to oversee the securities arbitration scheme 
would be a costly option and would take a considerable time to implement. For this 
purpose, it would be most cost effective for future civil compensation claims to be 
weaved into one of the pre-existing arbitration resources in China. It is suggested that 
China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) is the 
most appropriate forum for the following reasons.  
 
CIETAC is the most experienced forum for commercial arbitration in China which 
handles the majority of such disputes and at a service charge that the general market 
players can afford.111 CIETAC was founded in 1956 under the auspices of the China 
Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) to aid the CCPIT in 
                                                      
108 Ibid. at para 24-20. 
109 Daniel Fung and Wang Shengchang (eds), Arbitration in China: A Practical Guide (Sweet & 
Maxwell Asia, 2004), para 24-25. 
110 Confidentiality is another characteristic of arbitration that China may desire because China often 
does not want public transparency for its firms. For example, China has blocked attempts by the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board of the United States from examining the financial auditing of 
Chinese firms. 
111 Lijun Cao, CIETAC as a Forum for Resolving Business Disputes. Available at 
http://www.fljs.org/uploads/documents/Cao%231%23.pdf (last visited 16 April 2012)  
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promoting international trade by providing an impartial forum for the resolution of 
foreign-related disputes. Since then, it has transformed from a quasi-judicial dispute 
resolution body to a truly modern international commercial arbitration institution. 
Currently, it is the largest and busiest arbitration institution in the world in terms of its 
annual caseload. 112  It is also the leading arbitration commission in China, 
administering a wide array of domestic and foreign-related disputes, including those 
that involve international trade and investment, financial leasing and service 
contracts.113  
 
CIETAC’s popularity in the international arbitration community can partly be 
explained by its commitment to revise arbitration procedures in line with international 
practice and standards. The CIETAC Rules have been revised six times since its 
inception, and its recent amendment to the CIETAC Rules in 2005 appears to have 
addressed some of the most common criticisms leveled against the CIETAC 
procedures. 114  Most noticeable of all, for the first time, a list procedure was 
introduced for the selection and appointment of arbitrators who are not on its Panel of 
Arbitrators List by parties’ arbitration agreement.115 Prior to the introduction of this 
rule, CIETAC adopted the panel system whereby arbitrators from only within its panel 
of arbitrators could be appointed.116 This widening of potential arbitrators will 
increase dramatically the pool of experts and foreigners available to serve on a 
CIETAC tribunal and has significant practical impact on increasing the parties’ 
procedural autonomy.117  Although such appointment needs to be confirmed by 
CIETAC,118 in the words of one scholar, “such confirmation is more of a formality 
and the appointment of foreign arbitrators is most unlikely to be refused without a 
good reason”.119 This reform was coupled with measures to strengthen arbitrator 
impartiality. The revised CIETAC Rules provide that an appointed arbitrator must 
declare any matters that may raise reasonable doubts about their independence and 
impartiality and request his withdrawal.120 This should inject greater confidence on 
the independence of the arbitrators. CIETAC has recently indicated an intention to 
carry out further amendments to its arbitration rules in accordance with the 
                                                      
112 Raymond Leung (ed), China Arbitration Handbook (HK: Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), para 4.006. 
113  Ibid. 
114 Gu Weixia, “China’s Arbitration: Restricted Reform”, in Guanghua Yu (ed), The Development of 
the Chinese Legal System: Change and Challenges (Routledge, 2011), 273. 
115 Article 21 (2), CIETAC Rules (2005). 
116  Gu Weixia, “The China-style Closed Panel System in Arbitral Tribunal Formation - Analysis of 
Chinese Adaptation to Globalization”, 25 (2008) Journal of International Arbitration, 146. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Article 21(2), CIETAC Rules (2005). 
119 Jingzhou Tao, Arbitration Law and Practice in China (Kluwer Law International, 2008), at 120. 
120 Article 25, CIETAC Rules (2005). 
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developments in the Chinese market by requesting submission of proposals in late 
2010.121 
 
Aside from its emphasis on due process, CIETAC has maintained its institutional 
independence to a large extent. Unlike many local arbitration commissions, which are 
financially sponsored by the local treasuries and hence reliant on the local government 
for survival and development,122 CIETAC has retained its financial autonomy. The 
steady increase of the arbitration caseload has generated impressive income of 
arbitration fees, and as such, it is less prone to administrative interference.123  
 
From a functional point of view, CIETAC is best equipped to hear securities disputes 
because it has accumulated experience in handling securities and financial disputes 
over decades. As early as 1994, the State Council Securities Commission (SCSC, the 
predecessor of CSRC) designated CIETAC as the arbitral tribunal for disputes 
between securities firms or between securities firms and stock exchanges.124 At the 
time of this designation, the Securities Law was under draft. A Securities Arbitration 
Commission was proposed by the 1993 Draft of the Securities Law to be set up within 
the China Securities Association, dealing with disputes between securities firms and 
their clients, but this proposal was removed from the 1994 Draft of the Securities 
Law.125 Both the 1998 Securities Law and 2005 Securities Law have failed to 
mention the earlier proposal on the establishment of a specialist securities dispute 
arbitration tribunal.126 However, the emphasis on CIETAC by the State in resolving 
securities disputes is reflected. 
 
As a national arbitration commission, CIETAC is headquartered in Beijing, with three 
sub-commissions in Shanghai, Shenzhen and Tianjin.127  It has also established 
twenty-one liaison offices in different regions and in different business sectors to 
                                                      
121 CIETAC news, available at 
http://cn.cietac.org/NewsFiles/NewsDetail.asp?NewsID=896http://cn.cietac.org/NewsFiles/NewsDetail
.asp?NewsID=896 (last visited 16 April 2012). 
122 Gu Weixia, “China’s Arbitration: Restricted Reform”, in Guanghua Yu (ed), The Development of 
the Chinese Legal System: Change and Challenges (Routledge, 2011), pp. 274-276 (stating the 
inherent institutional defects of local arbitration commissions). 
123  CIETAC homepage, available at http://www.cietac.org (last visited 23 October 2012). 
124 The Notice of the SCSC on Designation of CIETAC as Arbitration Organization for Securities 
Disputes (Guowuyuan Zhengquan Weiyuanhui Guanyu Zhiding Zhongguo Guoji Jingji Maoyi 
Zhogncai Weiyuanhui We Zhengquan Zhengyi Zhongcai Jigou de Tongzhi), issued by the State Council 
on and effective as of August 26, 1994. 
125 See Zhu Sanzhu, Securities Regulation in China (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2000), pp. 
69-70. 
126 Ibid. 
127 They are CIETAC Shanghai Sub-Commission, CIETAC South China Sub-Commission (in 
Shenzhen), and the CIETAC International Economic & Financial Arbitration Center (in Tianjin) 
respectively.  
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promote its arbitration practice. 128  Its geographical presence and nation-wide 
resources may provide convenient hearing venues for which civil compensation cases 
may be resolved. 
 
Seen from this perspective, inviting CIETAC to be the arbitration institution can take 
advantage of its established dispute resolution experience and existing nation-wide 
arbitration resources. Moreover, it may leverage fully the financial and securities 
expertise within the CIETAC panel, as well as its back office support, such as finance, 
manpower, information technology, and premises.  
 
3. The Arbitration Process  
 
a. Eligibility requirements  
 
It is proposed that at the initial stage, shareholders can only bring “follow-up” actions, 
seeking compensation against a listed corporation and other relevant wrongdoers after 
the CSRC or other competent administrative agencies have decided that the conduct 
in question constitutes an infringement of the Securities Law. The proposal draws 
experience from the success of Lehman Brothers-Related Investment Products 
Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Scheme in Hong Kong, whereas investigative 
powers are resumed with Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) and Securities 
and Futures Commission (SFC). HKIAC, on the other hand, is mainly responsible for 
adjudication.129 Retaining the powers of the CSRC to deal with regulatory breaches 
while introducing CIETAC for damage award would avoid duplication of powers and, 
in addition, would not confuse the effective division of responsibility in financial 
dispute resolution.130 To be parallel with the civil actions, a limitation period should 
also be set so that a claim is not eligible for arbitration if two or more years have 
elapsed from the date of the decision, similar to the provisions under the SPC 
Circulars.131 Following an improvement in the civil discovery mechanism in China in 
the future, shareholders should be allowed to bring “stand-alone” actions, so that 
parties who considered that they had been affected by an infringement of the 
Securities Law should be entitled to take civil action for the recovery of damages 
suffered, regardless of the outcome of criminal or administrative investigations.  
 
                                                      
128 Examples include grain, commerce, construction, finance, leather and wool transactions. 
129 Gu Weixia, “ADR and Financial Disputes in Hong Kong: The Lehman Brothers Experience and the 
Way Forward”, (2011) Asian Dispute Review, 20-23. 
130 Ibid., at 23. 
131 Article 2 of the 2002 Circular and Article 5 of the 2003 Circular. 
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Critics have attacked the requirement for a prior administrative sanction or criminal 
judgment before the initiation of a civil compensation suit for depriving investors of a 
statutory right of private action.132 This is because under Article 6 of the Civil 
Procedure Law, courts are required to hear cases independently without inference 
from administrative agencies. Given that the securities market in China was intended 
to serve the economic goals of the State, it is conceivable that the prior decision 
requirement may create opportunities for alleged wrongdoers to escape civil liability 
by influencing the administrative or criminal investigation process through guanxi or 
bribery. 133 This would limit the civil litigation rights and the availability of 
compensation to defrauded investors who suffered economic losses. Moreover, 
according to Zhu, changing government policies may prevail through administrative 
agencies at the cost of the legal rights and interests of the public investors.134 
 
These are indeed valid criticisms of the securities enforcement regime in China. 
However, it is opined that the prior decision requirement is justifiable as a temporary 
feature of the securities arbitration system in view of the high information costs to 
bring securities fraud litigation. The stock market in China is heavily dominated by 
retail investors who lack the requisite skills and means to detect securities fraud. Not 
only do they have limited access to internal corporate documents,135 there is an 
absence of an elaborate discovery mechanism in China, which is likely to place 
potential claimants at a disadvantaged position in attempting to ferret out the 
information necessary to establish a claim. For instance, although the Civil Procedure 
Law empowers litigant representatives to investigate, collect evidence and inspect the 
files of a case in question, the scope and procedure for inspection shall be formulated 
by the Supreme People’s Court.136 There is, in addition, no duty on a party to respond 
to the other party’s requests for the production of documents, the deposition of 
witnesses or even to have questions answered prior to trial. Production of evidence 
may be compelled only when the people’s court considers it to be necessary for 
adjudicating the case in question.137 As defrauded shareholders have little means to 
                                                      
132 See, for example, Guiping Lu, “Private Enforcement of Securities Fraud Law in China: A Critique 
of the Supreme People's Court 2003 Provisions Concerning Private Securities Litigation”, (2003) 12 
Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 781.  
133 Ibid., 795-98. 
134 Sanzhu Zhu, Securities Dispute Resolution in China (Ashgate, the United Kingdom, 2007), p.204. 
135 For instance, Article 34 of the Company Law provides that shareholders are allowed to consult and 
copy the articles of association, records of shareholders’ meetings, resolutions of board meetings and 
financial reports. Shareholders are entitled access to the accounting books of the company upon 
submission of a written request which shall state its motives, but the company is at liberty to decline 
such request if it opines that the shareholders’ request is pursuant to any improper purpose which may 
damage the legitimate interest of the company.  
136 Article 61 of the Civil Procedure Law. 
137 Article 64 of the Civil Procedure Law.  
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obtain information about the fraud or misconduct at issue, they can avert difficulties 
in gathering the necessary information to prove their case if they could rely on the 
evidence gathered during the criminal or administrative investigations, thereby easing 
their evidentiary burden. Even in the US, where information costs are arguably lower, 
a 2003 study by Cox, Thomas and Kiku shows that enforcement actions by the 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) in the US are usually the foundation of 
successful private securities lawsuits.138 
 
While the CSRC and other administrative authorities are subject to conflicts of 
interest arising from the ownership structure of the listed companies in China, the 
policy dynamics are complex. Having pursued market-oriented reforms for more than 
twenty years, some Chinese leaders may find private securities enforcement a useful 
tool to play upon local protectionism. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the CSRC 
has taken a more active role in improving corporate governance at listed companies in 
recent years. In March 2007, the CSRC started a three-year campaign to strengthen 
corporate governance at listed companies.139 During the campaign, listed companies 
looked into existing problems in corporate governance such as misappropriation of 
corporate funds, irregular operations at the boards of directors, shareholders’ meetings 
and supervisory boards, and inadequate internal controls, and rectification measures 
have been made.140 It was reported that many governance problems were resolved 
and the culture of corporate and shareholder autonomy has been promoted.141 It was 
also said that the listed companies gained greater awareness of standard operations 
and improved their level of governance during the campaign.142  
 
b. The Arbitration Procedure 
 
It is advisable that CIETAC devise a set of procedural rules to administer the claims 
arising out of the securities arbitration scheme, which should be in line with the 
CIETAC Rules of 2012.143 In order to commence an action, potential claimants 
should submit an arbitration application together with a filing fee. Upon receipt of the 
                                                      
138 James Cox, Randall Thomas, and Dana Kiku, “SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical 
Inquiry”, (2003) 53 Duke L. J. 737, 737-738. 
139 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), China Country Study: 
Self-Assessment against the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (Jan 2011), pp. 6-8. The study 
is available at the OECD database, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/52/46931890.pdfhttp://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/52/46931890.pdf
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/52/46931890.pdf (last visited 16 April 2012).  
140  Ibid. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid. 
143   
Asian Law and Economics Conference, National Taiwan University, Taipei, June 20-21, 2014 
 
31 
 
claim and the fees, CIETAC’s secretariat should decide whether the case is eligible to 
proceed. In this connection, CIETAC’s secretariat should have discretion not to 
process cases that are clearly frivolous or vexatious. Arbitration proceedings should 
commence only if the secretariat decides that proper requirements have been 
complied with.  
 
Once the case has been accepted, either party may request CIETAC to settle the claim 
informally through mediation prior to the appointment of the arbitral tribunal. If both 
parties consented to mediate, they will proceed to select a mediator and attempt to 
reach an agreement. If the mediation process is successful, the parties will sign a 
settlement agreement, the terms of which may be incorporated into and issued as an 
arbitral award. Where the mediation process does not result in a settlement, arbitration 
proceedings will resume. Regardless of the outcome of the mediation process, 
however, nothing exchanged between the parties or the mediator during the mediation 
process may be relied on by the parties in subsequent judicial or arbitration 
proceedings unless the parties otherwise agree. Additionally, the claimant will be 
barred from pursuing the case further in court even if he wishes to dispute the 
arbitration award.144 
 
Where mediation is unsuccessful, the parties will proceed to select and appoint 
arbitrators. Depending on the amount of damages claimed and the parties’ wishes, a 
case may be heard by a mutually agreed arbitrator or a panel of three arbitrators,145 
but three arbitrators are usually appointed to form an arbitration tribunal. To further 
inject public confidence in the securities arbitration scheme, it is recommended that 
CIETAC might impose additional safeguards in the arbitrator selection process that 
extend beyond the requirements under its 2005 Rules. CIETAC should provide to the 
relevant parties information on the past education and employment history, past 
arbitration awards as well as other relevant background information for each of the 
arbitrators on the panel during the arbitrator selection process. The parties could make 
use of the information to strike names from the panel of arbitrator that may pose a 
potential conflict of interest with the witnesses, issues or securities in the case.146 
 
                                                      
144 Article 5 of the Arbitration Law. 
145 Article 30 of the Arbitration Law. One arbitrator is appointed for cases under the summary 
procedure. These are disputes where the amount claimed does not exceed RMB 500,000, or if the 
amount claimed exceeds RMB 500,000, where both parties agree to the adoption of the summary 
procedure. 
146  For background on the arbitration procedure, see Geoffrey Chan and Terence Tung, 
“Commencement of Arbitration and Arbitration Proceedings”, in Daniel Fung and Wang Shengchang 
(eds), Arbitration in China: A Practical Guide (Hong Kong: Sweet & Maxwell, 2004), paras 9-01 to 
9-06. 
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As the Hong Kong Lehman Brothers-related Investment Products Dispute Mediation 
and Arbitration Scheme reveals, a complaints-based approach in dealing with a 
multitude of individual cases may result in a slow dispute resolution process.147 In 
this light, procedural rules should be fine-tuned and group arbitration rules shall be 
incorporated to accommodate a number of claims involving similar questions of law 
or fact.148 In these cases, the first part of the proceeding should deal with the 
determination of the issue of liability of the defendant, while the second part of the 
proceeding should deal with the application of those legal principles to individual 
cases, and where appropriate, the assessment of the quantum of damages to be paid to 
individual members.  
 
Finally, it is proposed that the securities arbitration scheme be offered at a charge to 
both claimants and defendants along the lines of the existing fee structure for CIETAC 
arbitrations. The charge is intended to cover the arbitrator’s fees as well as CIETAC’s 
administrative expenses. It is believed that the enhanced private enforcement through 
arbitration will encourage more corporate compliance in China. In the long run, it is 
envisaged that greater shareholder protection will change China’s business culture and 
macroeconomics. 
 
c. Relationship with the Securities Regulators  
 
Structurally, the securities arbitration scheme and the securities regulator should be 
operationally independent so as to prevent any potential intervention by political and 
administrative powers into the scheme. For this purpose, it is desirable that the 
securities arbitration scheme achieve self-financing by relying on its arbitration fees 
for operation and development, instead of being under the shelter of the Party or the 
government. 
 
That said, the relevant securities regulators, such as the CSRC and the two stock 
exchanges, should be responsible for overseeing the securities arbitration scheme to 
maintain a strategic oversight. In this light, these regulatory authorities should be 
empowered, say, in the rule-making arena, to ensure that the enforcement initiatives 
under the arbitration scheme are complementary to the goals of securities regulation. 
On the other hand, to avoid duplication of efforts and blurring of their respective roles, 
                                                      
147 Douglas Arner, Barry Hsu, and Antonio Da Roza, “Financial Regulation in Hong Kong: Time for a 
Change”, 5(1) Asian Journal of Comparative Law (2010), pp. 1-47.  
148  Because securities litigation is substantially dependent upon group litigation, group arbitration in 
securities disputes is highly desired, for example, the importance of the PSLRA and SLUSA in the 
United States. 
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it is submitted that CIETAC should not have any investigative or disciplinary powers, 
which are within the purview of the securities regulators. CIETAC should be charged 
solely with the responsibility of handling civil compensation claims arising from 
securities fraud, and as such, will not issue fines, impose sanctions or take disciplinary 
actions. 
 
d. Implementation of the Securities Arbitration Scheme  
 
In the initial stage, a pilot scheme should be launched to test the effectiveness of 
arbitration in resolving civil compensation disputes arising out of securities fraud in 
China. The pilot scheme is suggested to last for three years to inform the investing 
public and other parties concerned about securities arbitration, so that a full evaluation 
can be made at the end of the scheme. If the scheme is successful, it is suggested that 
it should be made available nationwide on a continuous and permanent basis, and 
arbitration is to be incorporated into legislation accordingly.  
 
Since shareholder claimants will only opt for arbitration if they clearly understand the 
process, it is vital that the pilot scheme be widely publicized before commencement. 
In this light, it is proposed that there should preferably be a lead-in period of six 
months before the commencement of the pilot scheme to organize activities to 
promote the awareness and understanding of the service among the relevant 
regulatory authorities, the legal profession and members of the investing public. 
Dissemination of such knowledge is definitely a good starting point. In addition, an 
industry-wide effort should be made to solicit comments from securities regulators, 
scholars and practitioners so as to make the pilot project reflective of various interest 
groups. In the end, the experience gained during the lead-in period will be upgraded to 
a permanent and independent securities arbitration mechanism in the future. 
 
4. Concerns of Securities Arbitration  
 
Notwithstanding the seeming advantages of arbitration and the legislative 
endorsement of this dispute resolution mechanism, a few concerns may be raised for 
the securities arbitration scheme. 
 
a. CIETAC’s arbitral jurisdiction 
 
Critics may point out that CIETAC’s jurisdiction is limited, and should not be 
extended to securities claims. CIETAC can exercise jurisdiction over a case if the 
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subject matter of the dispute is arbitrable and the parties have entered into a valid 
arbitration agreement. Articles 2 and 3 of the Arbitration Law provide that disputes 
arising from economic and trade transactions of a contractual or non-contractual 
nature are arbitrable, whether they are classified as international, foreign-related or 
domestic. Article 3 of the CIETAC Rules (2005) stipulate that CIETAC may accept 
cases involving international or foreign-related disputes, disputes related to HK, 
Macao and the Taiwan region, and any domestic disputes. CIETAC however cannot 
exercise jurisdiction over disputes arising from marriage, adoption, guardianship, 
support and inheritance or disputes that a law requires to be handled by administrative 
authorities. It would therefore seem that civil compensation claims arising out of 
securities fraud is an arbitrable matter.  
 
It may also be argued that arbitration in China should only take place if the parties 
have entered into a prior arbitration agreement. Article 4 of the Arbitration Law 
provides that an arbitration commission may not accept the case if a party unilaterally 
applies for arbitration in the absence of an arbitration agreement. Article 16 further 
stipulates that an arbitration agreement shall be provided in a contract or any other 
written form of agreements.149 It shall include the parties’ agreement to submit a 
dispute to arbitration, specify the subject matter to be arbitrated and an arbitration 
commission to hear the dispute.  
 
In 2004, the Legislative Affairs of the State Council and the CSRC jointly 
promulgated a circular on the arbitration of securities and futures contractual disputes 
(the “Securities and Futures Disputes Arbitration Circular”).150 The circular is the 
most recent attempt of the Chinese government on the promotion of arbitration in 
securities dispute resolution, with an aim to make full use of special advantages of 
arbitration, such as expedition, flexibility, low cost, and closed hearing. Pitifully, the 
circular excludes the disputes between listed companies and public investors from the 
scope of securities arbitration.151 As explained by some learned commentators, one of 
the major barricades leading to the exclusion is that public investors do not have prior 
arbitration agreements with listing companies.152 
 
                                                      
149 An arbitration agreement shall contain (i) the expression of the parties’ wish to submit to arbitration; 
(ii) the matters to be arbitrated and (iii) the arbitral commission selected by the parties.  
150 Guanyu Yifa Zuohao Zhengquan, Qihuo Hetong Jiufen Zhogncai Gongzuo de Tongzhi (The 
Circular on How To Manage Well the Arbitration Work of Securities and Futures Contract Disputes 
according to Law), issued by the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council, January 18, 2004. 
151 Ibid, Point 1.  
152 Sanzhu Zhu, Securities Dispute Resolution in China (Ashgate, 2007), at 219. 
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To solve the problem, an arbitration provision should be mandated in the 
memorandum and articles of association of a listed corporation to the effect that all its 
shareholders are entitled to elect arbitration at CIETAC as a means to resolve civil 
compensation claims with the corporation. In addition, claims with other potential 
wrongdoers of securities fraud, such as fiduciaries, employees and professional 
advisers, could be covered. In terms of technical use, the provision would include 
details such as the method of selection and appointment of arbitrators, forum choice, 
and governing laws. For this purpose, employment and service contracts between the 
corporation and its employees, fiduciaries, professional advisers should reference 
such duty to arbitrate. Corporations that have already been listed on the national stock 
exchanges can effect such change by an amendment of the corporations’ constitutional 
documents, whereas the provision shall be made a requirement for listing under the 
listing rules for corporations that have not yet been listed.  
 
The first issue with this approach is whether such a provision in the memorandum or 
articles of association amounts to a written arbitration agreement that falls within the 
meaning of Article 16 of the Arbitration Law. While arbitration agreement in China 
should be in writing, the Arbitration Law is silent as to what constitutes written 
form.153 In this light, the CIETAC Rules (2005) provide that an arbitration agreement 
is in writing if it is contained in a tangible form of a document such as a contract, 
letter, telegram, telex, facsimile, EDI, or email.154 In this connection, a company’s 
constitutional documents have long been regarded as contracts between the 
corporation and each of its shareholders and among the shareholders inter se. They 
are deemed to contain covenants on both the corporation and all of its shareholders to 
observe the terms on the conduct of the corporate affairs. As the arbitration provision 
forms part of the corporation’s memorandum of association, the threshold requirement 
under Article 16 is likely to be satisfied. 
 
The second issue concerns shareholders’ notice of the arbitration provision. Effective 
shareholder notice is critical, lest shareholders could not be said to have consented to 
arbitration knowledgeably and entered into an arbitration agreement. Disclosure of 
information regarding arbitration should be included in the pre-dispute arbitration 
agreement so as to offer investors an opportunity to make informed decisions. One 
option is to reference the memorandum and incorporate the arbitration provision fully 
in the stock certificates issued by the listed corporation. However, many shareholders 
hold their shares through nominees and would never see the stock certificates that 
                                                      
153 Weixia Gu, “The Changing Landscape of Arbitration Agreements in China: Has the SPC-led 
Pro-arbitration Move Gone Far Enough?”, 2009 22(2) New York International Law Review, at 2. 
154 Article 5(3) of the CIETAC Arbitration Rules (2005). 
Asian Law and Economics Conference, National Taiwan University, Taipei, June 20-21, 2014 
 
36 
 
discuss the provision. An alternative option would be for the corporation to divulge 
details of the arbitration provision in the corporation’s website, its annual reports, 
CSRC filings and other disclosure documents on a periodic basis. Apart from that, all 
issuers could be obliged to attach their memorandum of association to each annual 
report filed with the CSRC under a new regulatory requirement in the listing rules, 
instead of incorporating the provision by reference to previous reports. This should be 
so regardless of whether amendments have been made to the memorandum in that 
financial year. To bring the arbitration provision to the attention of minority 
shareholders, some authors argue that the disclosure clauses should be made clear that 
arbitration is final and binding on the parties; in addition, parties who choose 
arbitration waive their right to seek remedies in court and no appeal thereto is 
allowed.155 
 
b. Deterrent Effect   
 
While confidentiality of the arbitration process and award is an advantage of 
arbitration, it may be said that this will leave future investors and the regulatory 
authorities in the dark as to the reasoning behind the decision and the range of 
compensation. An argument may be made out that this would harm other investors, 
produce inconsistent rulings and varying compensation rates, as the arbitrator decides 
a case on the basis of facts and circumstances available before him. This may have the 
effect of limiting the transparency and introducing a high level of unpredictability to 
the compensation process, which would in turn minimize the deterrent effect of 
private securities litigation.  
 
To allay the concern of inconsistent rulings, it is proposed that a system for the 
categorization for different investors based on factors relevant to the common dispute 
should be developed. This would allow for common standards of compensation to be 
applied to various shareholder groups, ensuring a degree of uniformity in the 
compensation awards. To deepen public understanding of securities disputes and to 
increase transparency in the dispute resolution process, the regulatory authorities may 
consider the publication of information regarding the securities fraud claims filed 
against the wrongdoers as well as cases that have been dealt with. However, given 
that agreements reached between parties in mediation and arbitration proceedings are 
private and confidential, we suggest that only a synopsis of cases on an anonymous 
basis should be published. It is hoped that this sharing of information will promote 
                                                      
155 Daniel Fung and Wang Shengchang (eds), Arbitration in China: A Practical Guide (Sweet & 
Maxwell Asia, 2004), para 24-41. 
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greater deterrence of securities fraud.  
 
Another concern relates to the deterrence of unmeritorious lawsuits before the arbitral 
tribunal. To prevent the critiques of US-styled class actions, it is submitted that 
CIETAC’s secretariat would have power to decide whether the case is eligible to 
proceed. Staff working at the CIETAC secretariat should have discretion not to 
proceed cases that are clearly frivolous or vexatious. The screening process by the 
CIETAC secretariat is important so as to deter unmeritorious claims that only benefits 
lawyers. 
 
c. Enforcement of the arbitral award 
 
Another concern relates to the enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards. 
Arbitration agreements and arbitral awards must undergo review by local Chinese 
courts for enforcement, but it is observed that during the transition from a planned 
economy to a market economy and in the process of developing the rule of law in 
China, lower-level courts in China are not sufficiently equipped to keep up with the 
pro-arbitration reforms initiated by the SPC.156 The lack of judicial integrity and 
quality as well as the unbalanced development among people’s courts at different 
localities may have contributed to divergent enforcement records in both court 
judgments and arbitral awards.  
 
Under the Chinese Arbitration Law, when a party fails to execute an arbitral award, 
the other party may apply for enforcement at the intermediate people’s court where its 
recalcitrant opponent has its domicile or its property is located at.157 Enforcement 
may be refused or set aside in limited circumstances, for instance if enforcement is 
against social and public interests or if there are procedural irregularities during the 
proceedings.158  
 
It is important to note that the SPC has stepped up its efforts as early as in 1996 to 
guard against local protectionism over arbitral enforcement and to facilitate the 
execution of arbitration awards. The SPC adopted a series of pre-reporting 
mechanisms (yuxian baogao) in handling foreign-related cases.159 By virtue of the 
“pre-reporting”, an intermediate people’s court is required to report its decision to the 
                                                      
156 Gu Weixia, “China’s Arbitration: Restricted Reform”, in Guanghua Yu (ed), The Development of 
the Chinese Legal System: Change and Challenges (Routledge, 2011), pp. 279-280. 
157  Article 58 of the China Arbitration Law. 
158 Ibid. 
159 Several Issues regarding the Handling by the People’s Courts of Certain Issues On Foreign-related 
arbitration and Foreign arbitration Matters issued on 28 August 1995 
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higher people’s court for approval if it is minded to set aside a foreign-related arbitral 
agreement and award.160 If the decision is upheld by the higher court, such a decision 
must be further reported to the Supreme People’s Court.161 Hence, the intermediate 
people’s court can only set aside a foreign-related award after approval from the SPC 
has been obtained.  
 
The dual regime may invite arguments of unfair discrimination between national and 
foreign investors. Foreign investors are given access to its securities market following 
China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Since 2002, foreign 
investors are allowed to invest in RMB denominated shares of corporations listed on 
the national stock exchanges under the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) 
Scheme.162 This is, however, contrasted with the enforcement of a domestic award, 
where grounds for refusal of enforcement are very broad, and could potentially lead to 
a complete review on the merits of the decision. Furthermore, the fact that the 
standards for enforcing domestic awards are stricter than foreign-related awards 
suggests that the domestic regime is harder. Specifically, in an empirical study 
conducted by Professor Randall Peerenboom, among the sixty-three domestic awards 
handled by one court in a large city in Jiangsu Province, two were refused and 
thirty-five listed as pending.163 It appears convincing that the domestic regime needs 
careful judicial checks as well, at least no less than its foreign-related counterpart. In 
this light, the different treatment may give rise to concerns about potential violations 
of the principle of national treatment.  
 
To overcome potential under-enforcement of arbitral awards, China should narrow the 
grounds for refusing to enforce arbitral awards under the securities arbitration scheme.  
Appeals on award should be limited to procedural review, which would align the 
Chinese procedure with international standards.164 A potentially large scope of review 
of an arbitral award under the local regime will obliterate the finality of the arbitration 
award and obstruct shareholder claimant’s access to judicial recourse by further 
                                                      
160 See the SPC Notice on Some Issues Concerning Foreign Arbitration and Arbitration in Foreign 
Countries, Fa Fa (1995) No.18; Notice on Regulations on the Fee and Time Limit of Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards, Fa Shi (1998) No.28; and Notice on Some Issues 
Concerning Setting Aside Arbitration Awards Related to Foreign Elements by the People’s Court, Fa 
Fa (1998) No.40. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Measures for the Administration of Securities Investment within the Borders of China by Qualified 
Foreign Institutional Investors (Hege Jingwai Jigou Touzizhe Jingnei Zhengquan Touzi Guanli Banfa), 
jointly issued by the CSRC, People’s Bank of China, and State Administration of Foreign Exchange, 
24 August 2006. 
163 Randy Peerenboom, “Seek Truth from Facts: An Empirical Study of Enforcement of Arbitral 
Awards in the PRC”, 4 (2001) American Journal of Comparative Law, 249. 
164  Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. 
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complicating the process for recovery of damages. The substantive review invites 
possibilities of political intervention in the enforcement process. In the long run, it is 
perceived that the foreign system is conducive to the development of the capital 
markets in China, albeit “pre-reporting” may invite challenges to judicial resources.   
 
 
V. Conclusion  
 
Although the Securities Law failed to provide an effective private cause of action for 
shareholders who suffered financial losses resulting from securities fraud, the SPC has 
purported to remedy the situation through issuance of three judicial circulars between 
2001 and 2003. The SPC circulars initially raised high expectations that they would 
provide the much-needed judicial safeguard against infringement upon interests of the 
minority shareholders. Despite these expectations, however, due to social, political 
and economic reasons, restrictive procedural rules and lack of economic incentives in 
the bringing of securities fraud suits effectively deprive aggrieved shareholders from 
access to the court and judicial remedies. 
 
From this basis, the fundamental issue at stake is how to best promote private 
enforcement while balancing the interests of the state. As the above analysis reveals, 
direct transplantation of the US-style class action system and contingency fee 
arrangements may give rise to a considerable risk of litigious abuse. In looking 
forward, it is proposed that a cost-effective and accessible dispute resolution 
mechanism be established to step up private enforcement efforts in China for the 
benefit of minority shareholder protection. Unduly legalistic procedures should be 
avoided to keep it simple and accessible for average retail shareholders.  
 
Thus guided, and drawing upon institutional experience from the US and HK, it is 
suggested that a securities arbitration scheme should be introduced as an out-of-court 
alternative under which wrongdoers of securities fraud are required to enter into 
arbitration at times of a civil dispute upon the wish of the claimant shareholder. It is 
believed that the absence of alternative methods in handling securities disputes 
contributes to a certain extent weaknesses in the securities market in China. Through 
utilizing the institutional and rule-making capacity at CIETAC, the premier arbitration 
commission in China, this arbitration proposal stands a better chance of success than 
the class action proposal in the Chinese context. Moreover, a securities arbitration 
scheme can supply the optimal amount of private enforcement to deter securities fraud 
and to redress defrauded shareholders. Hence, it can achieve a better model of 
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minority shareholder protection. 
 
Understandably, institutional deficiencies in the court system in China may invite 
doubts as to the effectiveness of the securities arbitration scheme. It is observed that 
lower-level courts in China are not sufficiently equipped, both infrastructurally and 
professionally, to keep up with the pro-arbitration reforms initiated by the SPC.165 
While addressing the local protectionism issue, the pre-reporting mechanism may 
drain judicial resources and lead to delays. In this respect, it remains open about the 
future fine-tuning of the procedural rules in view of the operational experience of the 
securities arbitration scheme. But just as every coin has two sides, the limitations of 
the securities arbitration scheme should not undermine its underlying benefits as a 
workable and even more effective means of private enforcement of securities 
regulation in China. Strengthening private enforcement efforts will be critical for 
China to improve its corporate governance landscape and to strengthen investor 
confidence, which in the long run, will bring about the healthy development of its 
securities market and act as an engine of economic growth. 
                                                      
165 Gu Weixia, “China’s Arbitration: Restricted Reform”, in Guanghua Yu (ed), The Development of 
the Chinese Legal System: Change and Challenges (Routledge, 2011), at 280. 
